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[The following essay has been submitted by the author in lieu of a transcript
of his remarksfrom the Colloquium presentation.]
U.N. PEACE AND SECURITY POWERS AND RELATED PRESiDENTIAL POWERS
The competencies and responsibilities of the United Nations concerning
peace are varied and complex. Clearly the Security Council has a primary
competence under Article 39 with respect to threats to the peace, breaches
of peace, and acts of aggression; however, efforts to assure the full meaning
of peace can implicate each entity within or connected with the United
Nations and a whole panoply of general purposes, principles, competencies,
rights, and obligations found in the United Nations Charter and authoritative
practice.
While the reach of Security Council peacekeeping and peacemaking
powers is quite extensive, it is limited by the U.N. Charter.' Each limitation
must be kept in mind not merely as a constitutional limitation on Security
Council power, but also as a limitation relevant to U.S. involvement in peace
and security operations and to the retained competence of the United States
to act alone or with others. Some limitations also provide, as Professor
Gabriel Wilner might state, "legal ... criteria for involvement." 2 The first

such limitation can be found in paragraph 2 of Article 24, which assures a
constitutional limit on power when directing that the Council, in discharging
its duties with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security,
"shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations." As noted in Article 1 of the Charter, such Purposes and Principles
include human rights and self-determination. Thus, the constituted authority
of the Security Council is conditioned by the need to serve, among other

* Professor of Law, University of Houston; Edward Ball Eminent Scholar Chair, Florida
State University, spring, 1997.
Jordan J. Paust, Peace-Making and Security Council Powers: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Raises International and Constitutional Questions, 19 So. ILL. U, L.J. 131, 137-42 (1994).
Here, I borrow extensively from the prior study. For a critique of expanding Security Council
powers, see, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Security Council, 18 WASH. Q. 2,
5 (1995).
2 Gabriel Wilner, letter to colloquium participants, Feb. 27, 1995.
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goals, human rights and self-determination of peoples.3
Second, these limitations are implicit in Article 25, since Members agree
merely to carry out "decisions of the Security Council [made] in accordance
with the ...Charter," and, thus, decisions made in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as well as other Charter-based
limits and duties.4 Third, Article 55(c) provides a general duty of the
United Nations (and, thus also, the Security Council) to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all . . . ."5 Fourth, customary jus cogens prohibitions, such as the prohibitions of aggressive force and genocide, should condition and limit U.N.
peace and security powers.6 In particular, Security Council actions under
Chapter VII of the Charter generally must not serve to encourage aggression
and genocide, as some actions apparently have with respect to BosniaHerzegovina. To the extent that they do, Members should not be bound to
participate. Fifth, as most writers recognize, Article 51 of the Charter
affirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs," at least "until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessaryto maintain international peace and security" (emphasis in original)
and those measures prove to be generally effective.7
An interesting question involves the relationship between Security Council
competence and the right of the United States to engage in defensive uses of
force when its military, embassy personnel, or other nationals are under
armed attack. While Security Council measures are taking place but not yet
effective, even if U.S. troops are participating in a U.N. operation, the United
States should not be precluded from using armed force where reasonably
needed to respond to an attack on U.S. military or other U.S. nationals
abroad. Article 51 of the Charter should still allow an Entebbe-type rescue

3 See Paust, supra note 1, at 131, 139-41.
Recently, the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognized that Article 24(2) of
the Charter limits Security Council powers. See International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: Decision in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 32, 42
(1996).
4 See id. at 141-42.
' See id. at 140-42.
6 See id. at 138-40.
' See id. at 137-38; James W. Houck, The Commander in Chief and United Nations
Charter Article 43: A Case of IrreconcilableDifferences?, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-14
(1993); Nicholas Rostow, The Seamless Web: ForeignPolicy and InternationalLaw, 88 AM.
Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 356, 360 & n.23 (1994).
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or protective mission,8 as well as other defensive uses of force reasonably

'On the lawfulness of Entebbe-type rescue or defensive missions, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 905, cmt. g (1985) (not violation
of U.N. Charter, art. 2(4)); BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
1305-06, 1314, 1358 (2d ed. 1995); LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 331 (1989); RICHARD B. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 614-16, 62224, 628 (2d ed. 1991); MYRES S. MCDOuGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 868-69, 876-78, 1419 (defense of forces) (1981);
Christopher C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness ofInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 133
(1984); John Norton Moore, Grenadaand the InternationalDouble Standard,78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 145, 153-54 (1984); Jordan J. Paust, Entebbe and Self-Help: The Israeli Response to
Terrorism, 2 THE FLETCHER FORUM 86 (1978); Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to
International Terrorism: The Use of ForceAbroad, 8 WHrrIER L. REv. 711, 728-29 & n.60
(1986); but see Louis Henkin, ASIL NEWSLETTER, (June-Aug. 1993), at 3 (addressed in Paust,
Response to President'sNotes on Missile Attack on Baghdad, ASIL NEWSLETTER, (Sept. Oct. 1993), at 4).
On the President's powers to protect U.S. nationals abroad, see, e.g., Cunningham v.
Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860);
E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 125-26 (1963); J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 213-14, 217-18 (3d ed. 1986); U.S. Dep't State
Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh, remarks, War Powers: A Test of Compliance: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Committee on
International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Executive has power "to rescue
American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign nationals where such action directly facilitates the
rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, to protect U.S. embassies and legations abroad .. "),
reprinted in THOMAS M. FRANCK, MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 603, 606 (2d ed. 1993); Report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the War Powers Act, S. Rep. No. 220, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted
in id. at 570, 574 (attack on U.S. forces), 577 (protection of American lives); Marian Nash,
Contemporary Practicein the United States Relating to International Law, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 96, 122 (1995); Statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, Department of State on
Legal Authority for U.N. Peace Operations Before the Legislation and National Security
Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, March 3, 1994, reprintedin
33 I.L.M. 821, 827 (1994) (President has constitutional authority to "take part in or support
UN peace operations, when he considers that to be necessary to protect U.S. nationals or other
U.S. national security interests."). See also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 263, 269-74 (1990); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 54, 308
n.47 (1972). Article 51 powers under the U.N. Charter, as treaty-based powers, should also
enhance presidential power. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. On defense of a
nearly-national abroad, see Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right
Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 543, 566 & n.156 (1989) (discussing the Koszta matter). It is also recognized that
an attack "on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State" can
constitute an act of aggression. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974,
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needed under the circumstances. It might be useful to coordinate U.S.
actions with U.N. operations. Article 49 of the Charter requires "mutual
assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security
Council," but defensive measures under Article 51 of the Charter need only
be "reported" to the Security Council.
Peace and security powers are also enhanced by the many purposes and
principles contained in the U.N. Charter. For example, paragraph 1 of
Article 1 addresses the related purpose of the U.N. "to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace."
As in the past, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations might involve
various peace-enhancing components. The prevention of threats to the peace
can involve authorized self-determination assistance and the promotion of
human rights,9 thus implicating other purposes outlined in Articles 1 and 2
of the Charter. The recent U.N. efforts concerning Haiti provide an example
of the conjoining of these purposes.'0 Similarly, efforts to stop Iraqi
aggression also promoted self-determination and human rights.
Future efforts authorized by the Security Council might more openly
involve human rights enforcement, including enforcement of relevant
international criminal laws beyond merely the establishment of international
criminal tribunals (perhaps even authorizing operations to capture alleged
international criminals and to end related threats to peace and security).
Future operations might also involve the recovery of stolen nuclear or
art. 3(d), U.N. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
9 See also U.N. G.A. Res. 39/2 of Sept. 28, 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, 14-15,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (vote: 133-0-2) (condemning the illegal regime in South Africa and
urging assistance to the people in their legitimate struggle for national liberation and a
democratic society based on majority rule); U.N. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
28, 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) (re: self-determination assistance); U.S. Administration
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 33 I.L.M. 795, 803 (1994) ("sudden
interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with
violence, or threat of violence"); infra notes 10, 42.
10See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Res. 940 (July 31, 1994) (characterizing the junta as an "illegal de
facto regime," reaffirming the "goal of the international community" to restore "democracy
in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President," welcoming the report
of the Secretary-General and his support "for action ... to assist the legitimate Government
of Haiti," acts under Chapter VII to authorize states "to use all necessary means to facilitate
the departure from Haiti of the military leadership ... [and] the prompt return of the
legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities ..
"); Christian
Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed, 5
CRIM. L.F. 237, 239 & n.5 (1994). See infra note 42.
"See JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
79 (1996).
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biological weapons, efforts to counter international terrorism, and hostage
rescue or protective missions as well as more general forms of humanitarian
intervention.
DOMESTIC PEACE AND SECURITY POWERS AND THE CHARTER

What power does the President of the United States possess to assure
adequate U.S. participation in U.N. operations such as those mentioned
above? First, in view of the President's duty under Article II, section 3 of
the U.S. Constitution faithfully to execute the laws and the fact that the
United Nations Charter is treaty law of the United States, it is evident that
the Charter can enhance presidential powers.' In this respect, there is a
conjoining of the faithful execution of the laws power and the treaty power.
Also relevant are the Executive power,1 3 the President's foreign affairs
power 4 and, in time of hostilities at least, the commander in chief power. 5 Importantly, only the commander in chief power is addressed in
Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution. 6
Counterposed to these are the various powers of Congress under Article
I, section 8 of the Constitution, including its share of the war power 7 and8
the far-reaching, but not all-encompassing, "necessary and proper" clause.'
Additionally, Congress clearly has the potentially inhibiting power of the

12 See,

e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 142 & n.34, 144, 146-50. See also JOHN HART

ELY,

WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH

14-15, 155-56 nn.19-20 (1993); infra note 30 and text accompanying note 34.
13Paust, supra note 1, at 144, 148; Harper, supra note 8 (In addition to statutory authority
in the U.N. Participation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act and various authorization and
appropriations acts, "the President has independent constitutional authority, as Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive with responsibility for the conduct of U.S.
foreign affairs ... ").
"4 See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950); United
States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Harper, supra note 8; infra note 34.
" See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 144, 148; Harper, supra note 8; infra note 34.
16 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 144. Thus, the WPR does not seem to regulate other
presidential powers under the Constitution. See also Section 8(d)(1) of the Resolution. 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); cfid. § 2(a). Moreover, the fact that only the
commander in chief powers are addressed is relevant to interpretation of war-related phrases
contained in the WPR such as "hostilities" and "combat". See also infra note 50. Indeed,
the name of the resolution also points to the fact that these terms are related to war.
17Paust, supra note 1, at 147-48 & n.56.
18U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also Paust, supra note 1, at 148.
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purse string. With respect to restraints on the treaty power, Congress has the
power to pass legislation that can bind the President domestically to act
inconsistently with a treaty if: (1) the legislation is last-in-time; 9 (2) the
legislation is unavoidably inconsistent with the treaty; (3) there is a clear and
unequivocal evidence of congressional intent to supersede the treaty;' (4)
none of the various exceptions to the last-in-time rule apply; 2 and (5) the
legislation is not unconstitutional (for example, as an impermissible
infringement on the constitutional separation of powers).
With respect to new efforts in Congress and the so-called National
Security Revitalization Act, 22 it is evident that the effect of such a legislative scheme might involve the weakening of U.N. peacekeeping and
peacemaking by significantly limiting or jeopardizing U.S. participation.
U.N. peace and security operations should be responsive to various crises as
they arise, and so should U.S. participation. In my opinion, the legislative
scheme would impermissibly interfere with presidential powers and needed
flexibility in the area of foreign affairs and national and international
security, especially with respect to (1) congressional waivers or approval for
joint or foreign commands, and (2) ad hoc congressional waivers or approval
for monies for special operations beyond those previously authorized or
within a normal budget.23 Congress should tolerate greater Executive
control of the details of command and the power of the United States to
respond to threats to peace and national and international security. When

'9 See generally Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional
Power and InternationalLaw: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of

Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988).
20 See generally Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22

(1963); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S.
446, 448 (1924); Chew Heong v. United Sates, 112 U.S. 536, 539-40, 549-50 (1884); United
States v. The Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Paust, supra note 19, at 400 n.9.
21 See Paust, supra note 19, at 398-419, 447-48; JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL
LAW
AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 99 (1996).
2 See Eric Schmitt, House Votes Bill to Cut U.N. Fundsfor Peace Keeping, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1995, at A6; Steven A. Dimoff, New Congress poses tough challengesfor U.N. and
UNA, THE INTERDEPENDENT, Winter 1994-95, at 1.
23 See also supra note 22. On related presidential commander in chief powers, see, e.g.,
United States v. Sweeney, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.
2), (1866); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615, 618 (1850); Swaim v. United States,
28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), aft'd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
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war is at stake Congress admittedly has a greater need to participate, but
even then the sharing of the war power involves several complexities and
separations of power and responsibility.
New legislation might require reports to Congress that contain too many
details, such as the size, composition and objectives of U.S. forces, and
information concerning reliance on foreign troops for security and support
as well as the ability of such forces to perform.24 Such detailed reports
could seriously jeopardize both U.S. force and U.S. national security as well
as the security of others. In terms of separation of powers, such details are
best left with the commander in chief.
With respect to the legislation, if it is finally enacted and can pass
constitutional muster, it might have only a limited effect. A 1996 act may
be last-in-time with respect to the U.N. Charter as such, but there is no
guarantee that it would prevail over a subsequent Security Council resolution" or a new Executive agreement made pursuant to the Charter and/or
a new resolution of the Security Council.26 As the Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States affirms, "binding resolutions
such as those of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the United
have the effect of law. ' 27 Judicial opinions confirm
Nations Charter, ...
that Security Council resolutions have such an effect 2 and are even relevant
to application of the last-in-time rule. 29 Accordingly, a 1996 act might be
trumped by a latter-in-time Security Council resolution, and the President
will have the power as well as the duty to follow the prevailing law.30

See supra note 22.
See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 144-45, 148-50.
' See, e.g., id. at 146-50; RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 115 cmt. c, § 303 cmt. f.
27 RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 102, cmt. g and reporters' note 3.
2 See Paust, supra note 1, at 144 n.47.
2 See, e.g., Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973).
3 See generally ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 87-92 (1991); Thomas M. Franck
& Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 63, 72, 74 (1991); Houck, supra note 7, at 15-16 & ns.65-66 (cf id. at 17); Paust,
supra note 1, at 144-45, 148-50; Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power
Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 903, 920 n.76, 958-59 (1994); text accompanying note 34 infra; see also
Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility:
ConstitutionalLessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1364, 1372, 1390-91
& n.78, 1394 (1994); Frederic Kirgis, remarks at the Colloquium (binding resolutions can be
'
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Indeed, more generally the President has the power and duty to execute
a Security Council resolution, as any law, unless an exclusive congressional
power is directly at stake or per terms of a particular resolution it requires
prior legislative implementation. In fact, one of the express presidential
powers, the "Executive" power, is close in name and meaning to the word
"execute." The Constitution confirms that the President has the power
(Article H, § 1) and the duty (Article H § 3) to execute law.3 Thus, unless

self-executing and relevant); Leigh, supra note 8 (Executive has power "to carry out the terms
of security commitments contained in treaties"); Dellinger, supra note 8, at 125 n.7
("Moreover, the deployment accorded with United Nations Security Council Resolution No.
940 (1994)"); John W. Davis, W. W. Grant, Philip Jessup, George-Rublee James T. Shotwell,
Quincy Wright, "Our Enforcement of Peace Devolves Upon the President," letter, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1944 (President has "powers to carry out a commitment for participation in
international policing such as that" under U.N. S.C.); cf. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTrrUTION 190-92 (1972) (U.N. Charter duties and undertakings with respect
to war and peace are "consistent with the Constitution" and the place of treaties "in the
constitutional pattern," especially since "Security Council orders" are subject to the
President's concurrence or veto and the President acts also "pursuant to a treaty ...
implemented by Congress."); but see ELY, supra note 12, at 11, 151-52 n.60; Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The ConstitutionalResponsibility of Congressfor Military Engagements, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 58, 67 (1995); letter by Professors Bruce Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori
Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B.
Kurland, Lawrence Tribe, William Van Alstyne, to Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger, Aug. 31, 1994, reprinted in 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 ("In Dellums, as here, the
United Nations Security Council had issued a resolution authorizing member nations to 'use
all necessary means' to drive Iraq from Kuwait. In our judgment, that resolution does not
absolve Congress of its constitutional obligation to approve military action or the President
of his constitutional obligation to seek and obtain that approval. To the contrary, the wording
of Security Council Resolution 940 respecting Haiti 'authorizes,' but does not require,
member nations to take military action, and expressly leaves each member nation, according
to its own constitutional processes, to decide whether warmaking is 'a necessary means' to
carry out its international obligations."); Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter,85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74, 75, 81, 88 (1991).
31 The RESTATEMENT also recognizes that even a non-self-executing agreement can be
executed by "appropriate executive or administrative action." RESTATEMENT, supra note 8,
§ 111 cmt. h; see also id. § 303 cmt. g. Moreover, treaties have been implemented by
executive agreements. See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 526-29 (1957); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15 (1957); Coplin v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 115 (1984) rev'd on other
grounds, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), af'd, 479 U.S. 27 (1986); RESTATEMENT, supra §
115 cmt. c, § 303(3) cmt. f and Reporters' Note 6; LOUIS HENKIN, supra, note 30, at 176.
On the President's duty to execute, see generally Paust, supra note 19, at 423-25 & ns.59-61;
Jordan J. Paust, The PresidentIs Bound by InternationalLaw, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987);
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); A. HAMILTON
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a matter lies directly within the exclusive prerogative of Congress, it is
otherwise constitutionally precluded, or legislation is required by the
international instrument, the President must faithfully execute even an
otherwise non-self-executing law. Further, whether a resolution is "selfexecuting" domestically should not inhibit any effect it may have abroad.
Thus, even a "non-self-executing" resolution should be binding on the United
States in its actions abroad or at the international level if such an effect is
consistent with the terms of the resolution considered in context,3 2 and the
President's powers and responsibilities would thereby be enhanced.
An interesting question arises when the Security Council resolution is not
strictly "mandatory" but "authorizes" states to participate in a military action,
especially in the context of a "decision" of the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter. Such was the case with respect to Iraq and
Haiti. 33 Further, this is what the Executive utilized in the case of BosniaHerzegovina, the President stating in 1994 that military actions were taken
pursuant to his "constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as
Commander-in-Chief" and as measures taken as part of a "NATO enforce-

Pacificus No. 1, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 35, 38, 40, 43 (H. Syrett
ed. 1969) (President "is charged with the execution of all laws," ["duty to enforce the laws"]
is
including treaties and the law of nations [", the laws of Nations, as well ... [i]t
consequently bound ...."],and since "[o]ur Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part of
the law of the land," the President has both "a right and ... duty, as Executor of the
J. Madison, Helvidius, 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 107 (G. Hunt ed. 1906)
laws ....");
("That the executive is bound faithfully to execute the laws of neutrality ... is true.... It
is bound to the faithful execution of these as of all other laws, internal and external, by the
nature of its trust and the sanction of its oath .... ); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800)
(Representative Marshall in 1800: "He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared
to be a law. He must then execute a treaty, where he .... possesses the means of executing
it... [and he] is accountable to the nation for the violation of its engagements with foreign
nations, and for the consequences resulting from such violation .... ); THE FEDERALIST No.
3 (J. Jay) ("the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the
same manner..." (emphasis added)); P. DUPONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1824) quoted at 11
F. Cas. at 1120 n.6 (law of nations "acts everywhere proprio rigore" and "is binding on every
people and on every government. It is to be carried into effect at all times... [e]very branch
of the national administration ...is bound to administer it ...[iut can never cease to be the
rule of executive and judicial proceedings ...").
32See Theodor Meron, Extra-territorialityof Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
78, 78 n.5 (1995).
33See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 145 n.51.
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under the authority of U.N. Security Council Resolu-

tions. 34
An Executive claim might be that even an authorizing resolution, as part
of a treaty process, is still an authorizing law which the Executive has
discretion to execute or comply with on behalf of the United States-that
even if the Executive is not bound to implement the resolution, executive
power is enhanced because treaties which have the effect of authorizing
action (or treaties plus resolutions thereunder which do the same) are laws
of the land. The President's duty faithfully to execute legal "mandates" also
reaches, and is enhanced by, treaty law and the President's duty is one
involving the good faith exercise of discretion conferred by a Security
Council resolution.3 5 Moreover, such authorizing resolutions are evidently
"decisions" 36 of the Security Council (and, in context, not mere "recommendations") within the meaning of Articles 25 and 48 of the U.N. Charter.
The President might also have the power to circumvent such legislation
by an Executive agreement made pursuant to the U.N. Charter. For example,
an Executive agreement pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter to supply U.S.
military forces for U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, as a
treaty-executive agreement, might well prevail over previous and inconsistent
federal legislation, including the War Powers Resolution and the United
Nations Participation Act.37

34See id. at 144 n.45.
3- See supra notes 30, 34; PAUST, supra note 21, at 444, 464-65. As in the case of any
treaty, a conferred discretion must be exercised in good faith and not in a manner thwarting
of the overall object and purpose of the treaty. Such is an obligation relevant to the
President's duty faithfully to execute the law.
'6 But see Houck, supra note 7, at 6.
37 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 146-50. An executive agreement that attempts to
implement a treaty is considered to be one made "pursuant to a treaty" and to have the status
of a treaty. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 115 cmt. c, 303 cmt. f. The
RESTATEMENT recognizes that the last-in-time rule does not apply in the case of a clash
between certain "sole" executive agreements and an act of Congress and that inconsistent
legislation prevails. See § 115 cmt. c and Reporters' Note 5; see also American Cetacean
Society v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct.
2860 (1986) (statute and executive agreement interpreted consistently); United States v. Guy
W. Capps, Inc. 204 F.2d 655, 659-60, passim (4th Cir. 1953), affid on other grounds, 348
U.S. 296 (1955); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Col. 1983), affd,
479 U.S. 27 (1986); JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTTrurIoNAL LAW § 6.9
at 220 (4th ed. 1991) ("If the President's authority to promulgate an executive agreement does
not derive from his exclusive presidential powers.., then the executive agreement should
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not be able to override an earlier enacted federal statute."); COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1078 (4th ed. 1995) ("The basic rationale of Youngstown is
that a president has no inherent power to repeal or suspend an act of Congress."); DANIEL G.
PARTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCESS 644 (quoting former Judge Bork: "it is certain
...that the President could not make substantive law in direct opposition to legislation by
Congress. This is the lesson of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.. "),647 ("it seems equally
clear that executive agreement law must be subordinate to both statutes and self-executing
treaties.") (1992); PETER M. SHANE, HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
543-44 (1988) ("Unless an executive agreement may be connected to at least implicit statutory
authorization, it is probable that, unlike a treaty, it may not override prior statutes."); BURNS
H. WESTON, RICHARD A. FALK, ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 195 (2d ed. 1990) (last-in-time rule not applicable to executive agreements); cf.Coplin

v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 115 (1984) (treaty-executive agreement), rev'd on other grounds,
761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), affd, 479 U.S. 27 (1986). Only a sole executive agreement
within an exclusive Executive power (such as recognition of foreign states or governments
and armistice agreements) should prevail over legislation, but it would be the separation of
powers and not the last-in-time rule that compels such a result. See HENKIN, supra note 30,
at 177-78, 186; Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treatiesand Congressional-Executiveor
PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments of NationalPolicy, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
317 (1945). Of course, a treaty-executive agreement or a congressional-executive agreement
at least has the status of its coordinate legal base (i.e., a treaty or a statute). See RESTATEMENT, supra § 115 cmt. c.
The same result follows even more logically with respect to a clash between a mere
executive regulation (not within an exclusive Executive power) and an act of Congress. See
The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92, 112-13 (1874) ("No power was ever vested
in the President to repeal an act of Congress" and presidential proclamations of amnesty did
not have such an effect); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 330-33 (1818) (statute
controls presidential instructions regarding: seizure of vessels); The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170, 177-79 (1804) (statute prevails over presidential orders); United States v. Smith,
27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (Paterson J., on circuit) ("The
president of the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and
still less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids. If he could, it would render
the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure, which is a doctrine that has not
been set up, and will not meet with any supporters in our government."). Moreover, the lastin-time rule does not apply to a clash between a constitutionally valid treaty and a mere
executive regulation, since only federal statutes (and possibly some executive agreements) are
generally coequal with treaties as domestic law and the Executive is bound by treaty law
while it remains extant. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No.
13,799) (Curtis, J., on circuit) ("treaties must continue to operate as part of our municipal law,
and be... executed by the President, while they continue unrepealed.... no body other than
Congress possesses [the power to] refuse to execute a treaty."), affd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481
(1862); Paust, supra, note 19, at 423-25 & ns.59-61; supra note 31; but see Louis Henkin,
The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 936-37 & ns.19-20 (1986)
(addressed in Paust, The PresidentIs Bound, supra note 31, at 384). This should especially
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The U.S. deployment of troops in Haiti has raised related issues. When
one reads recent communications on the constitutionality of the planned U.S.
military operation in Haiti, one is struck by the seeming manipulation of
several terms. Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger's letter prefers
"operations," "measures," and "deployment" in justifying presidential
prerogatives short of "war, ' 38 whereas Professor Lori Damrosch favors
"hostilities," "invasion," "a shooting war," and "combat" while arguing for
congressional primacy 39 (although she nearly acknowledges a presidential
power to initiate 'certain ... low-level engagements'). 40

What would the planned use of our military against a resisting force of the
illegal regime in Haiti actually have involved? Certainly, this would not
entail a "war" or international "armed conflict" in the traditional sense (i.e.,
a use of armed force between states or nations under the authority of their
respective governments or leaders) 41 if the U.S. use of force had been
authorized by the legitimate governmental leader of Haiti and the illegal
regime had failed even to acquire the status of a "belligerent." As Professor
Michael Reisman suggests, it would not have been armed force against Haiti,
the de jure government, or the Haitian people, but force with the consent of
Haiti's elected President clearly consistent with self-determination of the
Haitian people and their human right to participate in a process of "authority" involving "legitimate" government,42 a point supported by legal

be true with respect to the U.N. Charter. See Paust, supra note 1, at 149 & n.72.
38See Dellinger, supra note 8, at 122, 125-26.
39See Damrosch, supra note 30, at 61-67.
4 See id. at 67. See also Phillip R. Trimble, The President'sConstitutionalAuthority to
Use Limited Military Force, 89 AM. J. INT'L L; 84 (1995).
41See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (Washington, J.) ("hostilities"
occur when "authorized by the legitimate powers.").
42 W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of InternationalAction, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 82, 82-84 (1995); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(3) reprintedin
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1948-1982 (1983);
Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33, 36; American Convention on
Human Rights, preamble and art. 29(c), O.A.S. Treaty Ser. No. 36, reprinted in 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 679 (1971); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XX (1948),
OEA/Ser.L.V/I.4 Rev. (1965); Thomas M. Franck, The DemocraticEntitlement, 29 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1 (1994); Moore, supra note 8, at 154 (if consent of the legitimate authorities, not
impermissible); Jordan J.Paust, Aggression Against Authority: -The Crime of Oppression,
Politicideand Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 283, 297-98
(1986); Jordan J. Paust, International Legal Standards Concerning the Legitimacy of
Governmental Power, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1063 (1990); Theo van Boven, General
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principles that seem to have escaped Professor Michael Glennon.43 It is
also evident that in such a circumstance use of the word "invasion" would
not be appropriate.
If the resisting military of the illegal regime had not even achieved the
status of an "insurgent" under international law (which would implicate
common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and words such as
'armed conflict,' 'hostilities,' and possibly 'noncombatants'), then use of
words such as "hostilities" and "combat" would have been improper.
Appropriate determinations of the status of belligerency or insurgency
involve contextual inquiry and, thus, implicate general matters such as the
"nature" and "scope" of deployments. One critical element concerning each
status involves the requirement of adequate control of significant territory, 44
a matter that must be tested contextually. Thus, when the U.S. declared that
it would "apply all of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.. . [i]f it
becomes necessary to use force and engage in hostilities, 45 the U.S.
conditioned application on the existence of actual "hostilities" and did not
even admit that all provisions, even then, would be technically applicable.46
Clearly, not every use or projection of military power is entwined in a
belligerency or an insurgency, and the existence of an insurgency seems to
pose the minimum threshold for "hostilities" or "combat." Nonetheless, if
an insurgency had occurred, Security Council authorization of military force
and direct U.S. participation would have internationalized the armed conflict,
at least in terms of Geneva law.47
Moreover, if an insurgency was not likely but a quick, overwhelming use

Course on Human Rights, 4 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law bk. 2, 1, 26
& n.37 (1995) (democracy); supra notes 9-10. On U.S. efforts in Haiti, see also Stephen J.
Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States:
Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
393, 418-60 (1994).
43 See Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community after Haiti: Rethinking the
Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J.INT'L L. 70, 71-72, 74 (1995).
"See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of InternationalCriminalLaws to Events in the
Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 499, 506 & n.27 (1994).
45 See U.S. Permanent Mission in Geneva, Diplomatic Note to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (Sept. 19, 1994), reprinted in part in Meron, supra note 32, at
78.
"Consider also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of civilian Persons in the
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950). Cf id. art. 16. See
generally Paust, supra note 44, at 512-13.
47See Paust, supra note 44, at 507-10.
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of military power with only sporadic and ineffective resistance, one could not
logically conclude that U.S. troops would have been "equipped for combat"
unless the words "for" and "combat" lose any common meaning. Certainly
troops are not equipped "for" combat if no "combat" is contemplated or
likely to take place.48 Therefore, I disagree with Professor Damrosch on
proper classification of the "Somalian experience"'' 9 and affirm Professor
Glennon's recognition that in Somalia there were no "hostilities" (nor an
'armed attack'), but some uses of force by "brigands."50 The question
shifts to whether international law addressing some of these very terms is
relevant to interpretation of the WPR and constitutional powers. Presumably
it is.5 '
In conclusion, it is evident that Congress seeks involvement in overall
decisionmaking concerning U.S. participation in peace and security
operations. If legislation goes too far it may lawfully be bypassed even if
it is not unconstitutional. The difficulty, it seems, will involve selection of
agreed criteria and procedures that provide sufficient flexibility and restraints.

48 See also U.S. Dep't State Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution
and Antiterrorist Operations, U.S. Dep't State, Current Policy No. 832, at 2, reprintedin part
in 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 636 (1986) (doubts whether WPR applies to use of antiterrorist units
"where no confrontation is expected between our units and forces of another state," since
likely that such action is outside language referring to "hostilities" or "forces equipped for
combat").
49 See Damrosch, supra note 30, at 64-65.
o See Glennon, supra note 43, at 70-71.
SI See also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125 (1814); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 41 (1801); Bas v.
Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800) (and supra note 41). See also supra note 16; 1973 Senate
Committee Report, supra note 8, reprintedin FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 8, at 570, 577
(" 'acts of war' in the sense of large-scale military operations against sovereign states ...
involving full-scale warfare against a foreign power ...... [and] "hostilities in Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, "hostility," 872 (4th ed. 1968) (addressing
"war" and the law of nations); see generally Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982);
United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1933); The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 117-18 (1804); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792).

